Regulating ADR: Lessons from the UK by Kirkham, R.M.
	



	

	



	

	
				
 
	

!∀#∃% &∋(	()∗

∀	!+,
	#−#%∋.
(	
/0∀

,
∀)		∗	
	
−%+−∋
	






	1	

				

DRAFT 
1 
 
 
Chapter 14 
Regulating ADR: Lessons from the UK 
RICHARD KIRKHAM* 
 
A. Introduction ............................................................................................ 2 
B. Challenges in regulating the ADR sector ................................................. 3 
1. The benefits and limitations of ADR ...................................................... 3 
2. The need to manage risks in the ADR sector ......................................... 5 
&,PSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGWKH8.·VFRQVXPHURPEXGVPDQV\VWHP .................. 7 
1. The regulatory consequences of the Directive in the UK ........................ 7 
2. The consumer ombudsman model in the UK ........................................ 8 
3. The legitimacy claim of the ombudsman model ................................... 11 
D. Evaluating the impact of the Directive on the consumer ombudsman 
model ........................................................................................................ 12 
1. The ombudsman promotes user access to justice ............................... 12 
The claim ............................................................................................ 12 
Enhancing consumer knowledge and managing expectations .............. 17 
2. The ombudsman allows for more justice to be delivered ...................... 19 
The claim ............................................................................................ 19 
Delivering individualised justice under the Directive ............................ 19 
3. The ombudsman promotes collective justice ....................................... 22 
The claim ............................................................................................ 22 
Delivering the lessons from complaints ................................................ 22 
4. The ombudsman is fair and operates to high standards ...................... 23 
The claim ............................................................................................ 23 
(YDOXDWLQJWKH'LUHFWLYH·VDSSURDFKWRVWDQGDUGV ................................ 24 
5. The ombudsman is accountable ......................................................... 25 
The claim ............................................................................................ 25 
Evaluating the strength of the UK structure of competent authorities .. 26 
                                                          
* School of Law, University of Sheffield. 
DRAFT 
2 
 
E. The future for the regulation of ADR in the UK ...................................... 28 
1. A unified competent authority ............................................................ 28 
2. Alternative sources of legitimacy ......................................................... 29 
F. Bibliography ......................................................................................... 31 
Literature ............................................................................................... 31 
Cases ..................................................................................................... 34 
Statutes ................................................................................................. 34 
 
A. Introduction 
The combined initiative of the Directive on Consumer ADR (WKH ¶'LUHFWLYH·1 
and the Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution for commercial disputes 
(the ODR Regulation)2 has further emphasised an ongoing shift taking place 
within the UK civil justice system. Once dominated by court based dispute 
resolution, the provision of UK civil justice is now increasingly reliant on a 
network of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) providers, within which 
multiple variants in process and form are used to settle disputes. A lot of 
KRSHKDVEHHQLQYHVWHGLQWKH'LUHFWLYH·Vsupport for this network,3 but this 
chapter argues that the UK strategy for implementing the Directive has been 
minimalist and that, as in other countries, this represents a missed 
opportunity. Although the provision of ADR may be enhanced through the 
Directive, the system of regulation for the ADR sector looks deficient. As a 
result, there is a heightened risk that sub-optimal standards in the sector 
will go undetected which may in turn undermine user confidence.  
Two key drawbacks with the implementation of the Directive in the UK are 
highlighted here: the lack of distinction made between the different forms of 
ADR and the dilution of the standards enforcement role of competent 
authorities. To illustrate the risks, this chapter focusses mostly on one form 
of ADR, the consumer ombudsman model, primarily because of its 
widespread prevalence in the UK, but also because of the bold claims made 
about the institution. The chapter begins in Part B by charting the 
landscape of ADR and highlighting its points of weakness as a provider of 
justice. The ability of the Directive to address such weaknesses is the key 
                                                          
1 2013/11/EU. 
2 (EU) 524/2013. 
3 EC Directorate General for Health and Consumers. Consultation paper: On the use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution as a means to resolve disputes related to commercial 
transactions and practices in the European Union. (2011), p. 3.  
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focus of this chapter. In Part C, the UK tradition of consumer ombudsman 
schemes is explained, along with the implementation of the Directive in the 
UK. In Part D five key claims made in favour of the ombudsman model are 
LQWHUURJDWHG DQG WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKH 8.·V LPSOHPHQWDWLon of the 
Directive has enhanced these claims analysed. The chapter concludes in 
Part E by exploring the options for making the regulatory structure stronger.   
In short, the Directive is capable of laying the foundations for a robust ADR 
system, but more work needs to be done to make the regulatory set-up a 
standard-bearer for the sector rather than a passive observer. Without this 
extra work, the credibility of consumer ADR and the integrity of the rule of 
law will be left under-protected.  
B. Challenges in regulating the ADR sector 
1. The benefits and limitations of ADR  
In the shadow of more formal legal institutions, over many years a network 
of ADR has grown-up in the UK and elsewhere. A key driver behind this 
development has been a need to respond to circumstance, with a common 
concern the limited capacity of the processes of judicial adjudication to deal 
with the scale and range of disputes that occur in the civil justice system. 
The Directive fits into this tradition, one which has a global heritage,4 with 
the main stated motivations behind it being to increase access to justice, 
whilst simultaneously reducing reliance on the court.5  
More so than the drafters of the Directive, however, theorising on ADR 
generally puts forward a bolder claim for ADR, one based on its capacity to 
dovetail the complexities of human interaction.6 For ADR proponents there 
is not one solution best equipped to resolve the very different types of 
conflict that occur in society. This makes ADR justifiable not just on 
pragmatic grounds, it is also essential so as to enable a suitable dispute 
resolution method to be selected according to needs and circumstance. By 
adopting the right process, the likelihood of the delivery of relatively quick 
justice is enhanced, as is the encouragement of amicable dispute resolution 
                                                          
4 0 &DSSHOOHWWL ¶$OWHUQDWLYH 'LVSXWH 5HVROXWLRQ 3URFHVVHV ZLWKLQ WKH )UDPHZRUN RI WKH
World-Wide Access-WR-XVWLFH0RYHPHQW·Modern Law Review 56, 282-296.  
5 EC Directorate General for Health and Consumers, n.3 above. 
6 C. Menkel-Meadow ¶$OWHUQDWLYHDQG$SSURSULDWH'LVSXWH5HVROXWLRQ LQ&RQWH[W)RUPDO
,QIRUPDODQG6HPLIRUPDO/HJDO3URFHVVHV·LQ3&ROHPDQ0'HXWVFKDQG(0DUFXVHGV
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, Wiley, 2014. 1 ² 28.  
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and the enhancement of better relationships and trust between consumer 
and provider.7 
Part of the power of ADR, therefore, lies in its flexibility and diversity in 
method and form. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to capture all the nuances 
in approach that now exist. The options range from highly proceduralised, 
almost tribunal-like mode adjudication services, through inquisitorial-based 
ombudsman schemes, to arbitration, mediation and conciliation services.8 
All these forms of ADR have their merits, but the methods deployed within 
them vary and overlap, with some providers applying a range of the 
techniques within one staged service.9 Further, the outputs vary. Thus some 
schemes (and processes) offer as an endpoint an adjudicated decision, 
whereas others focus only on negotiating a settlement. Some schemes 
conclude with a solution binding on both parties, some only binding on the 
trader, some binding on neither party. Some schemes operate fully 
independently of the sector against which complaints are brought, some 
operate within trade associations or within the investigated organisation 
itself. Some schemes are state sponsored, others industry sponsored. Some 
schemes now offer a completely online service. 
This distribution is to be expected, but does raise difficult questions. For 
instance, is it viable to anticipate in advance which forms of ADR should be 
deemed appropriate for which types of dispute?10 A solution to this dilemma 
might be to make the process adopted the choice of the parties to a dispute, 
but this option will not always be realistic. Often the choice is largely 
dictated either by WKH VWDWH·V structuring of the civil justice system or the 
stronger party in the dispute. In the commercial world this potential raises 
the possibility that the interests of the consumer in a cheaper, quicker and 
more user-friendly outcome might EH XVHG WR ¶EX\· WKHm into a weaker 
system of justice to their disadvantage. 11  These concerns are enhanced 
where the ADR system is funded by the private sector itself. 
                                                          
7  R. Behrens, Public Trust and the Ombudsman: the case of the OIA, Office of the 
Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education, 2015.  
8 For a full analysis of the variety of ADR in the EU, see C. Hodges, I. Benöhr and N. 
Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe. Oxford: Hart, 2012. 
9 C. Gill, J. Williams, C. Brennan and C. Hirst, Models of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR). 4XHHQ0DUJDUHW·V8QLYHUVLW\-26. 
10 C. Menkel-0HDGRZ ¶)URP /HJDO 'LVSXWHV WR &RQIOLFW 5HVROXWLRQ DQG +XPDQ 3UREOHP
Solving: Legal DisputH 5HVROXWLRQ LQ D 0XOWLGLVFLSOLQDU\ &RQWH[W·  Journal of Legal 
Education 7-29 [2004]. 
11 (%UXQHW¶4XHVWLRQLQJWKHTXDOLW\RIDOWHUQDWHGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQ·Tulan Law Review 
  + (LGHQPLOOHU DQG 0 (QJHO ¶$JDLQVW )DOVH 6HWWOHPHQW 'HVLJQLQJ Efficient 
&RQVXPHU 5LJKWV (QIRUFHPHQW 6\VWHPV LQ (XURSHO·  Ohio St. Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 261 [2014]. 
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A further challenge for the ADR sector is the body of well-rehearsed critiques 
that its processes bypass and undermine essential rule of law obligations.12 
For instance, there is a public value in the process of seeing justice done 
¶WKDW WUDQVFHQGV SULYDWH LQWHUHVWV· 13  such as the maintenance of an 
appropriate and well-constructed body of consumer law. The sheer 
effectiveness of the ADR bargain offered to the consumer might lead to a 
diminution in the development of the law as cases to the courts dry up14 and 
¶WKH JXLGDQFH IXQFWLRQ RI VXEVWDQWLYH ODZ· PD\ EH HURGHG15 Further, the 
rights-based model of justice in-built in the legal process is concerned with 
modifying behaviour around the rule of law.16 If hard enforcement of judicial 
rulings of the rights of consumers becomes rarer, this may in turn lead to 
businesses becoming less cautious in their attempts to comply with 
consumer protections built into the law or contract.17  
Overall, against the known imperfections and limitations of existing formal 
legal processes, ADR can be argued to offer superior solutions in certain 
circumstances,18 not least because for consumers the courts will often not 
be a viable route for obtaining redress.19 Individual consumers may also 
have good reason to prioritise user-friendly informal dispute resolution over 
justice. But, if a key aspiration remains the promotion of justice, as well as 
the resolution of disputes,20 then there is need for some form of background 
safeguarding to ensure adequate levels of performance in the sector, as well 
as protections for the rule of law.   
2. The need to manage risks in the ADR sector 
A number of points follow from the above introduction to the ADR sector 
which should shape any analysis of the implementation of the Directive. 
First, there is an overlap in roles being performed by ADR providers. 
Primarily they aspire to resolve and settle disputes, but they do so within a 
larger landscape of civil justice and rule of law values. Although given 
                                                          
12 2)LVV¶$JDLQVW6HWWOHPHQW·Yale Law Journal 1073 (1984). 
13 +*HQQ¶:KDW,V&LYLO-XVWLFH)RU"5HIRUP$'5DQG$FFHVVWR-XVWLFH·Yale Journal of 
Law & the Humanities: Vol. 24: Iss. 1 (2012), Article 18, 398.  
14 /0XOFDK\ ¶7KH&ROOHFWLYH ,QWHUHVW LQ3ULYDWH'LVSXWH5HVROXWLRQ·, 33 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 59 (2013) 59-80.  
15 +/LQGEORP ¶$'5² The Opiate of the Legal System? Perspectives on Alternative 
'LVSXWH5HVROXWLRQ*HQHUDOO\DQGLQ6ZHGHQ·European Review of Private Law 1-2008, 63-
93, 72. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Eidenmiller and Engel, n. 11 above, 2014, pp.278-80 
18  / )XOOHU ¶7KH )RUPV DQG /LPLWV RI $GMXGLFDWLRQ· LQ . :LQVWon (ed), L. Fuller, The 
Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon Fuller, (Hart Publishing, 2001). 
19 &+RGJHV¶&RQVXPHU5HGUHVV,PSOHPHQWLQJWKH9LVLRQ·FK6 of this edited collection. 
20 12
%ULHQ¶7KHRPEXGVPDQDVGHPRFUDWLF¶DOWHUQDWLYH·: Reading the EU Consumer ADR 
'LUHFWLYHLQWKHOLJKWRIWKH3$6&UHSRUWV·Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, (2015) 
37:2, 274-282.  
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minimal coverage, this latter duty is recognised in the Directive which 
UHTXLUHV$'5SURYLGHUVWR¶KDYHVXIILFLHQWJHQHUDONQRZOHGJHRIOHJDOPDWWHUs 
LQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHOHJDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHGLVSXWH·21  
Second, theory does not provide us with neat answers as to when and how 
different forms of alternative, or judicial dispute resolution, should apply. 
Indeed, the balance and shape of the ADR sector is driven by a combination 
of market and state pragmatism, as determined by ongoing reflections on 
current practical experience.22 Nevertheless, institutional design still has a 
role to play in protecting the underlying goals of the civil justice system.   
Third, while all forms of ADR have strong claims to functionality and 
purpose, none are immune from criticism. But criticisms of an ADR scheme 
might be manageable provided that key stakeholders can be persuaded of its 
continuing benefit, relevance and effectiveness. But this outcome should not 
be taken for granted. Disillusionment and distrust with all forms of justice 
provision can occur. In the ADR sector, there is a particular problem in that 
often the parties can refuse to participate in the process and fall back on 
their legal rights. The rulings of ADR providers or the standards they 
promote can also sometimes be lawfully flouted. Sustained behaviour of this 
nature could lead to legal challenges against ADR schemes, user flight to 
other sources of dispute resolution and even organised campaigns against 
an ADR mechanism.  
Fourth, if correct, what this logic implies is that all forms of ADR benefit 
from a background quality assurance structure which is capable of 
defending them from various layers of challenge and critique. From the 
FRQVXPHU·V SHUVSHFWLYH ZKDW LV needed is reassurance that an ADR 
mechanism has adequate means of persuasion, is sufficiently ambitious in 
its interrogation of disputes, has not been captured by the stronger party, 
and provides a suitable quality service. Conversely, businesses and 
government need to be persuaded that an ADR mechanism is not too costly, 
cannot become a dangerous maverick or operate with a remit which 
contains too much discretion such that it threatens the authority of 
investigated bodies.  
The Directive represents a response to this need for reassurance as to the 
quality of ADR by establishing a regulatory structure designed to strengthen 
¶ERWKFRQVXPHUV·DQGWUDGHUV·FRQILGHQFHLQ>$'5@SURFHGXUHV·23 It does this 
by setting standards for the design, process and performance of ADR 
                                                          
21 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Recital 36, as implemented by Art. 6(1)(a), see also Art. 11.  
22 R. %RQH ¶/RQ )XOOHU·V theory of adjudication and the false dichotomy between dispute 
UHVROXWLRQDQGSXEOLFODZPRGHOVRIOLWLJDWLRQ·Boston University Law Review 1273-1321 
[1995], 1284. 
23 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Recital 36. 
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schemes in the sector. Further it establishes a network of competent 
authorities to monitor and enforce those standards. Therefore, the key 
components of good regulation are present.24 The question explored in this 
chapter is whether through implementation the UK Government has made 
the system robust enough to safeguard the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the sector, and protect it from reputational risks. 
&,PSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGWKH8.·VFRQVXPHURPEXGVPDQ
system  
1. The regulatory consequences of the Directive in the UK 
,QWKH8.WKH'LUHFWLYH·VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDPRXQWHGWRDPLQLPDOHQGHDYRXU
in harmonisation because many of its background goals had been already 
realised. The Directive has been implemented by way of secondary 
OHJLVODWLRQ¶WKH8.5HJXODWLRQs·25 and for the UK raises few completely new 
requirements. A process of checking that domestic legislation was in 
compliance with the various standards set by the Directive had to be 
followed, and arrangements made for ADR in areas not previously covered.26 
A system of accrediting competent authorities and reporting requirements 
had to be put in place.27 Additionally, the ODR Regulation obliged all EU 
online traders to provide a link to the ODR platform on their website and the 
Directive meant that all traders, even non-participating traders, had to 
inform consumers of available ADR opportunities.28   
Beyond these obligDWRU\ FRPPLWPHQWV WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW·V
implementation strategy comprises an uneasy compromise between a stated 
policy aim to enhance consumer rights and an ideological commitment to 
minimise the regulatory burdens on industry. The latter goal entails that the 
operational and consequent costs of delivering ADR cannot be ignored, 
particularly if the public purse or business is expected to be the sponsor. 
This has led the Government to adopt a laissez-faire model of ADR within 
which, outside existing statutory schemes, the shape and extent of the ADR 
sector is left to the combined responses of traders. Further, competition in 
provision is encouraged and used to drive standards and reduce costs.  
                                                          
24  R. Baldwin, and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
25 The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for Consumer Disputes (Competent Authorities 
and Information) Regulations 2015 (as amended by the Alternative Dispute Resolution for 
Consumer Disputes (Amendment) Regulations 2015).  
26 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Art 5(3). 
27 Regulation 8, n. 25 above.  
28 Regulation 19, n. 25 above.  
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One significant extra cost on both businesses and consumers, and 
potentially government, is the accepted need for regulation. It is noticeable, 
however, that in the UK the regulatory impact will be reduced in two 
respects.  
First, the Directive treats the ADR sector as a homogenous entity.29 This 
looks like an efficient solution, but carries the risk that the diversity of 
methods and processes being deployed in the ADR sector will not be fully 
captured. If regulation is to succeed in providing stakeholders reassurance 
that ADR schemes are credible, then the standards that are set need to be 
appropriate for the form of ADR concerned and be sufficiently rigorous. But 
with the Directive, standards have been selected on the basis that they are 
generalizable to the ADR sector as a whole. A danger with this approach is 
that standards are set at a low common denominator in order to be 
appropriate for all forms of ADR. But if the standards developed do not 
connect sufficiently to the claims being made in favour of an ADR scheme, 
the Directive will provide reduced assistance in persuading stakeholders 
that a form of ADR is legitimate and effective.  
Second, the UK Government has chosen to implement its regulatory duties 
in minimalist form by distributing the function of ADR competent authority 
across a number of pre-existing regulatory mechanisms. An argument 
pursued below is that this regulatory strategy also makes it more difficult for 
any one form of ADR to promote, demonstrate and protect its core claims to 
legitimacy and effectiveness.  
To illustrate the impact of this implementation strategy in the UK, in this 
chapter the focus will be on only one form of ADR, the consumer 
ombudsman model, as it is probably the most commonly used form of ADR 
in the UK. However, the same set of issues may affect the remainder of the 
ADR sector.  
2. The consumer ombudsman model in the UK 
The UK was one of the earliest adopters of the consumer ombudsman model, 
starting with the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau in 1981. The first wave of 
development FRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVWKH¶SULYDWLVDWLRQRIGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQ·30 
with various corporate sectors organising the provision of private 
ombudsman schemes. 31  But from the late twentieth century onwards, 
                                                          
29 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Art 2(1). 
30 R. James, Private Ombudsmen and Public Law. (Socio-legal Studies, Dartmouth, 1997), 
p.2. 
31 For an analysis of the history of Consumer ADR, see C. Gill, J. Williams, C. Brennan and 
12·%ULHQThe future of ombudsman schemes: drivers for change and strategic responses, 
(Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh: 2013), pp.9-13. 
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legislation was passed which led to the formation of a number of statutory 
schemes. By 2015 there was a wide-ranging network of independent 
ombudsman schemes in place across many consumer sectors,32 and one 
which had already experienced reform and innovation. There were also other 
sectors in which either regulators or the industry itself strongly encouraged 
and made available complaint-handling services, with all schemes carrying 
the title ombudsman operating independently from industry. Nevertheless, 
large areas, such as the retail and transport sector, continued to operate 
with little or no ADR, let alone ombudsman, provision.33   
The growth of the consumer ombudsman model, together with its 
predecessors in the public sector, led to the ombudsman sector becoming an 
embedded feature of the civil justice system in the UK. This achievement 
should not be underestimated, as establishing and maintaining the 
credibility and authority of the ombudsman institution is everywhere a 
challenge. Evidence for the status of the ombudsman comes from several 
sources.  
First, the scale of use of ombudsman schemes is substantial, as indicated 
by Table 1. The numbers provided need to be treated cautiously because, 
pre-ADR Directive, the reporting criteria used varied enormously from 
scheme to scheme. Nevertheless, the turnover of complaints is impressive.    
Table 1: Applications/complaints received for the 2014/15 or last reported year, as per the 
relevant annual reports and court records. 
Consumer 
Ombudsman 
schemes 
 Public Sector 
Ombudsman 
schemes 
 Courts for 
England and 
Wales34  
 
Financial 
Ombudsman 
Services 
329,509 Parliamentary and 
Health Services 
Ombudsman 
8,03735 County Court 
Civil (non-
Family) 
1,534,58436 
Ombudsman 
Services 
62,80637 Scottish Public 
Services 
Ombudsman 
4,895 Administrative 
Court 
(Judicial 
Review) 
4,06438 
                                                          
32 (QHUJ\ÀQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQOHJDOVHUYLFHVWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVSHQVLRQV
SRVWDOVHUYLFHVUHDOHVWDWHDQGJUHHQGHDOVHH3&RUWHV¶7KHLPSDFWRI(8ODZLQWKH$'5
landscape in Italy, Spain and the UK: time IRUFKDQJHRUPLVVHGRSSRUWXQLW\"·ERA Forum 
(2015) 16:125²147, p. 138. 
33  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Consultation on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, March 2014, pp. 15-6 and Annex B. 
34 Figures taken from the Ministry of Justice, Civil Justice Statistics Quarterly: England and 
Wales, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/civil-justice-statistics-
quarterly-july-to-september-2015 
35 Referred to assessment. 
36 October 2014 ² September 2015. 
37 Complaints resolved in year. 
38 2014 
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Furniture 
Ombudsman 
2,49239 Public Services 
Ombudsman for 
Wales 
2,296   
Legal 
Ombudsman  
18,185 
 
Northern Ireland 
Ombudsman 
830   
Pensions 
Ombudsman  
1,28140 Local Government 
Ombudsman 
20,286   
 
Other reports have indicated a steady, if not uniform, increase in the 
complaints received by most ombudsman schemes and suggested that over 
time there has been a generally higher propensity for people to complain.41 
Within this cultural shift, significant numbers of consumers now use the 
ombudsman sector to pursue their grievances DV ¶WKH GLVSXWH UHVROXWLRQ
SDWKZD\ RI FKRLFH IRU· FXVWRPHU-to-business claims,42 and in some areas 
quite possibly to the effective exclusion of the courts. Meanwhile, the 
number of small claims hearings in the courts has been decreasing 
noticeably in recent years.43 
A second source of strength for ombudsman schemes in the UK is the 
emphasis placed upon ADR by successive governments and the sectors 
within which they operate. There are multiple instances of Government 
papers and legislation supporting and directly implementing policies that 
have sought to encourage and even prioritise ADR solutions over 
judicial/court-based solutions. 44  Into this renewed vision of justice, the 
ombudsman model sits very nicely.     
Finally, the ombudsman model has been boosted by favourable judicial 
oversight of the sector. With at least the statutory ombudsman schemes in 
the UK now subject to judicial review, an increasing body of case law has 
developed around the work of the sector. A few exceptions aside, the case 
law that has evolved out of the senior courts has been broadly supportive of 
the ombudsman model.45 
                                                          
39 Includes only complaints investigated. 
40 Includes only new complaints investigated 
41 Gfk NOP (2013) Complaints to Ombudsman Services: Energy, Report for Ofgem exploring 
why few consumers refer their complaint to Ombudsman Services: Energy, p. 36; Gill et al n. 
31 above, pp.15-20. 
42 &+RGJHV¶'HOLYHULQJ5HGUHVV7KURXJK$OWHUQDWLYH'LVSXWH5HVROXWLRQDQG5HJXODWLRQ·in 
WH van Boom and G Wagner (eds), Mass Torts in Europe: Cases and Reflections (De Gruyter 
2014), para.20. 
43 &+RGJHV¶&RQVXPHURPEXGVPHQEHWWHUUHJXODWLRQDQGGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQ·ERA Forum 
(2014) 15: 593²608, 606-7. 
44 Genn, n. 13 above; Mulcahy, n.14 above.  
45 5.LUNKDP¶8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKH&DVH/DZRQWKH2PEXGVPDQ·Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law, (2016) 38:3, xx-xxx. (forthcoming). 
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3. The legitimacy claim of the ombudsman model  
7KH ¶RPEXGVPDQ HQWHUSULVH· KDV ORQJ EHHQ SURPRWHG DV D QHFHVVDU\
institutional solution to the increased demands on the civil justice system of 
the early 21st century.46 An ombudsman differs from other forms of ADR in 
that it is a predominantly inquisitorial dispute resolution service that is 
ultimately capable of adjudicating a dispute. Therefore, although the model 
often relies on the use of a variety of soft methods to be employed to arrive 
at a consensual settlement, its core legitimacy claim is that it can efficiently 
and effectively supply independently derived just and authoritative decisions.  
%XWWKHRPEXGVPDQ·VIOH[LEOHLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVLJQHQDEOHVLWWRGRPRUHWKDQ
provide an efficient and proportional dispute resolution service. The 
ombudsman model can contribute considerable front-end consumer support 
services,47 such as advising citizens and triaging complaints. Indeed, for 
most schemes the turnover of enquiries is higher than the complaints that 
are fully investigated.48 The model also offers the potential for promoting 
collective quasi-regulatory goals, including the dissemination of the lessons 
learnt from complaints.  
In recent times the power of this combined claim has led some to conclude 
that in certain sectors a serious policy option is effectively to phase out the 
role of the courts in favour of the ombudsman.49 But the accepted legitimacy 
of the ombudsman variant of dispute resolution cannot be assumed, as 
ombudsman schemes can be subject to significant user scepticism of their 
claims to delivering effective justice.50 In this respect, the Directive provides 
a convenient opportunity to bolster the foundations of the ombudsman 
model, raise standards and shore up its legitimacy in the eyes of 
stakeholders.  
In the next section, five of the ombudsman model·Vmain legitimacy claims 
are worked through to test the impact on the sector of the Directive and its 
implementation in the UK. These claims are that an ombudsman: (i) 
improves access to justice, (ii) increases the provision of individual justice, 
(iii) enhances enforcement of collective justice, (iv) operates fairly and (v) is 
accountable. 
                                                          
46 T. Buck, R. Kirkham and B. Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative 
Justice (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), ch.2. 
47 Ibid, ch.4 
48 Hodges, n. 43 above, 597. 
49 Ibid, 606 and Rogers, n. 19 above, p. x. 
50 Eg Communities and Local Government Committee, The Work of the Local Government 
Ombudsman, 2012/13 (HC 431).  
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D. Evaluating the impact of the Directive on the consumer 
ombudsman model 
1. The ombudsman promotes user access to justice 
The claim  
As with other ADR forms, it is commonly argued that an ombudsman can 
increase access to justice and thereby help prevent civil justice gaps 
emerging.51 Being ordinarily free to use and positively supportive of non-
technically proficient complainants, an ombudsman scores highly in access 
terms. An ombudsman also offers the capacity for proportionate dispute 
resolution because of the range of different techniques it can deploy. As 
such an ombudsman is well placed to appear an attractive dispute 
resolution route, even when the grievance involves low sums of money.   
The extent to which WKH'LUHFWLYH·V implementation assists the ombudsman 
sector in promoting access will be considered through three interconnected 
sub-questions.   
(i) Increasing awareness of consumer ombudsman schemes 
Despite its natural user advantages, there has always been a struggle to 
inform consumers of their rights to access an ombudsman scheme. But the 
Directive has operated as a one-off form of free advertising through 
conferences, various industry journals and the national media all giving 
prominence to the sector to a degree that would have been unlikely without 
the legislation. A further short-term impetus might derive from the 
simultaneous coming into force of the Consumer Act 2015.  
Looking further ahead, the requirement for all businesses with unresolved 
complaints to notify their customers of the availability of ADR providers is a 
positive measure, which can reasonably be expected to go some way towards 
educating consumers on an ongoing basis.52  But concerns have already 
EHHQ H[SUHVVHG WKDW PDQ\ EXVLQHVVHV ZLOO RQO\ SD\ ¶OLS VHUYLFH· WR WKH
requirements.53 Further, the enforcement potential of this law is unclear as 
it requires checking websites, contracts and individual communications 
between traders and customers. In the UK, reliance for enforcement will be 
                                                          
51 ,%HQ|KU¶&RQVXPHU'LVSXWH5HVROXWLRQDIWHU7KH/LVERQ7UHDW\&ROOHFWLYH$FWLRQVDQG
$OWHUQDWLYH3URFHGXUHV·Journal on Consumer Policy (2013) 36: 87²110. 
52 Regulation 19, n. 25 above. 
53 P. Causton Confusion reigns ² BIS Survey ² ADR Directive and ODR Regulations, 16 
December, 2015. Available at: http://www.promediate.co.uk/confusion-reigns-bis-survey-
adr-directive-and-odr-regulations/  
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placed upon existing budget strapped trading standards bodies,54 which in 
operation will risk being non-compliant with the spirit of the Directive which 
UHTXLUHV ´HIIHFWLYH SURSRUWLRQDWH DQG GLVVXDVLYH SHQDOWLHVµ 55  The 
Government has also encouraged the introduction of new players into the 
ADR market. Leaving aside the merits of this policy, extra provision and 
competition adds incentives and opportunities in the ADR sector for 
providers to promote their services amongst the business community and 
the public. More advertising, innovative use of social media and other forms 
of promotion should result from the underlying need for ADR providers to 
generate business. 
To supplement the work undertaken by ADR providers themselves, the 
Government has committed itself to supporting a complaints online and 
telephone ´KHOSGHVNµ WR LQFUHDVH DZDUHQHVV RI $'5 DQG WKH SURFHVV IRU
accessing it.56 This policy it has proposed to achieve through funding a UK 
charity, Citizens Advice, albeit the budget for that organisation is itself 
under significant pressure. An alternative is for the free market to fill the 
information void, as with the rapid growth of the internet site Resolver,57 
which provides within one easy to use website access to the knowledge you 
require to pursue almost the entire network of complaint systems available 
for consumers. 
Overall, therefore, the Government might claim some success in raising 
awareness of ADR as a result of the implementation of the Directive, albeit 
one achieved through minimum endeavour and reliant upon the ongoing 
goodwill and continued input of traders and a number of non-government 
organisations. 
(ii) Increased availability to ombudsman schemes dependent on the market 
Before the Directive, in the UK there was not universal provision of an 
ombudsman, or ADR, service across the consumer sector, with the 
suggestion that powerful business and departmental interests were resistant 
to creating new barriers to free trade.58 Under the Directive, however, the 
Government has to ensure that all sectors are at least covered by an ADR 
                                                          
54 Under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002, an enforcer can apply for an enforcement order 
from the court if the enforcer believes that a trader is not complying with its obligations 
under Regulation 19, n. 26 above.  
55 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Art.21. 
56 BiS, n. 33 above, 16. 
57 http://www.resolver.co.uk/ 
58  W. Merricks, Private Sector Ombudsmen and the Administrative Justice System. 
Speech at the annual conference of the AJTC, 12 November 2009. Available at: 
http://ajtc.justice.gov.uk/adjust/articles/conf09_merricks.pdf 
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scheme, subject to the exceptions of health and publically provided further 
or higher education.59  
Table 2 details the accredited ADR sector as of the implementation date for 
the Directive. For the time being, the Government has relied upon all sectors 
being filled by applicants rather than appointing a residual provider. 60 
Should these schemes make an economic decision to withdraw or narrow 
their services the Government would have to reconsider its position.61 
Table 2: ADR provision over consumer to business disputes according to competent 
authority, as of 1 October 201562 
COMPETENT 
AUTHORITY 
ACCREDITED ADR PROVIDER 
Secretary of State for 
DWP  
Pensions Ombudsman Service 
Financial Conduct 
Authority 
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) 
Legal Services Board   
Civil Aviation Authority Ombudsman Services 
Gambling Commission  
 
ADR Group, BACTA ADR service, Centre for Effective Dispute 
Resolution (CEDR ), eCOGRA, IBAS, Isle of Man Gambling 
Supervision Commission (IoM), Jennifer Gallagher (Lindsays), 
Joel Goldman, National Casino Forum - Independent Panel for 
Casino Arbitration, Ombudsman Services, Tattersalls 
Committee  
Gas and Electricity 
Markets Authority 
(Ofgem)  
Ombudsman Services 
Office of 
Communications  
 
Ombudsman Services: Communications, Communications and 
Internet Services Adjudication Scheme (CISAS), The Postal 
Redress Service  
National Trading 
Standards Estate Agency 
Team, Powys County 
Council63 
The Property Ombudsman, Ombudsman Services: Property, 
Property Redress Scheme   
 
Chartered Trading 
Standards Institute64  
ABTA, Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), 
British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association (BVRLA), Centre 
for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), Dispute Resolution 
                                                          
59 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Art. 2(2). Because most UK students have to self-finance their 
higher education, the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education has gained accredited 
status. 
60 In different ways, Ombudsman Services, Pro Mediate, Small Claims Mediation, the Retail 
Ombudsman and the Furniture Ombudsman all offer ADR that covers a very broad reach 
over the consumer landscape.  
61 Cortes, n. 32 above, p.140. 
62 Information taken from the websites of the Competent Authorities. 
63  The lead enforcement authority for the purposes of the Estate Agents Act 1979 
(residential property). 
64 Responsible for non-regulated industries. 
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Ombudsman (DRO), Federation of Master Builders, Furniture 
Ombudsman, Home Improvement Ombudsman (HIO), Motor 
Codes, National Conciliation Services, NetNeutrals EU, Office of 
the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education, 
Ombudsman Services, Pro Mediate, Property Redress Scheme, 
Renewable Energy Consumer Code, Small Claims Mediation, 
The Independent Parking Committee Ltd (The Independent 
Appeals Service), The Property Ombudsman, The Retail 
Ombudsman, TrustMark, The Waterways Ombudsman  
 
The Directive has, therefore, made a difference in increasing ADR coverage,65 
but what the Directive and its implementing UK Regulations have not 
necessarily achieved is any expansion in the availability of ADR. The 
Government has rejected the idea of expanding the scope of mandatory ADR 
coverage for consumer to trader dealings, and has not added to the list of 
compulsory schemes.66 In evaluating the merit of this policy, two key areas 
of the consumer sector provide clues as to how it might play out.  
First, the Chartered Trading Standards Institute (CTSI) has been made 
responsible for accrediting ADR schemes in those consumer areas where 
there is not already in place a regulator with responsibility for complaint-
handling. This is a vast terrain within which traders will not be obliged to 
use ADR, and includes much of the travel and retail sector. Here the 
Government has left it to the market to decide whether ADR is required, and 
for those business sectors currently outside of the ADR network to be 
persuaded of its merits and become voluntary adopters. The extent to which 
the ombudsman providers operating in this sector, Ombudsman Services 
(and its self-badged Consumer Ombudsman service), the Retail Ombudsman, 
and the Furniture Ombudsman67 manage to capture new business will be 
the litmus test of the success of this approach. 
A second way forward is for individual sectors to agree collectively to the 
benefits of ADR. An example of this development can already be found in the 
aviation sector. Participation in ADR remains voluntary EXW WKH VHFWRU·V
competent authority, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), has responded to 
the Directive by moving away from acting as a joint regulator/complaint-
handler towards a model of accrediting an independent ADR provider to 
operate as the Aviation Ombudsman.68 Further, it has explicitly stated that 
                                                          
65 There is currently no ADR scheme accredited by the Legal Services Board (see below), but 
both Pro Mediate and Small Claims Mediation can receive complaints from the sector.   
66 BiS, n. 33 above. As of writing, a proposal from the EU Commission to amend the 261 
Regulation to incorporate mandatory ADR is under debate. 
67 Although predominantly the Furniture Ombudsman deals with complaints about the 
purchase of furniture products and fittings, it offers to its members the additional service of 
dealing with complaints about other products.   
68 Civil Aviation Authority, Consumer complaints handling and ADR, CAP 1286, April 2015. 
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it might in the future advise Government to introduce legislation to make 
ERWK PHPEHUVKLS RI DQ $'5 VFKHPH DQG DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH VFKHPH·V
determinations mandatory.69 In doing so the CAA has cited the unfairness of 
requiring consumers to go to court to enforce their consumer rights.  
Such soft processes towards expanded ADR coverage may work. But the 
concern is that they cannot tackle the access to justice problem unless 
traders can be persuaded of the merits of ADR. In order to persuade traders 
of the tangible benefits of ADR, providers will need to be innovative in their 
sales pitch and offer different forms of services depending on the needs of 
the trader concerned. But whether businesses make the choice to adopt 
ADR is dependent on a commercial equation as to the economic and 
information benefits to be secured from participating in an ADR scheme.70 
On this equation, there is research to suggest that many businesses will not 
voluntarily opt for ADR.71 The costs of participation will look significant in 
the short-term and may not outweigh either the potential costs of judicial 
dispute resolution or an alternative investment in enhanced internal 
systems of customer service.72 A risk is also created that providers might 
reduce the quality of their service both to reduce costs and to seduce traders 
into ADR. 
Another downside of the free market approach towards ADR provision is 
that individual ADR schemes might, for reputational reasons, actively 
choose not to accept complaints from certain sectors and traders. What 
might result, therefore, is a two tier network of ADR providers, with the top 
tier processing complaints from safer, more long-standing and, from the 
perspective of the ADR provider, more cost-effective traders; and the bottom 
tier including those ADR schemes that effectively sweep up the remainder of 
the market.     
Notwithstanding the problems with the voluntary approach, however, it is 
not clear that mandatory ADR coverage is the right solution or that the 
imposition of extra costs can be justified. Indeed, an organic approach to the 
expansion of the ADR sector, built around identifying concentrations of poor 
customer service,73 matches the logic of the predominantly consensual and 
informal approach to dispute resolution which the sector is grounded upon. 
                                                          
69 Ibid, para. 74. As of writing one airline had signed up to the new ombudsman scheme. 
70  C. Hodges and N. Creutzfeldt, Implementing the EU Consumer ADR Directive. The 
Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, University of Oxford, Policy Brief, 2013, 5. 
71 Consumer Council, Back to Business (published in January 2014) 
72 IT packages are now available for purchase that enable traders simultaneously (a) to offer 
a more direct ongoing consumer relationship and (b) to collate more data on their 
customers.   
73 Which?, Consultation Response: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers, Available at: 
http://www.staticwhich.co.uk/documents/pdf/alternative-dispute-resolution-for-
consumers-which-response-371039.pdf 
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It is also an approach that should facilitate diversity, experimentation and 
innovation in ideas on how to do dispute resolution, including encouraging 
traders to do more to manage intelligently their own internal complaint 
systems. Imposing a mandatory consumer ombudsman scheme might even 
lead to neutering the viability of other ADR methods which may be more 
appropriate.  
Alternatively, the need for imposing any mandatory solution might be offset 
by the development of an Online Court that by itself provides a more 
realistic choice for consumers to bring legal proceedings than the current 
small claims court.74 As for the dangers from competition in ADR provision 
RI ¶URJXH· RPEXGVPDQ DQG $'5 VFKHPHV HPHUJLQJ which offer a service 
more amenable to the trader than the consumer, here the answer lies in the 
rigour of the regulatory process, a point which is returned to below. 
Enhancing consumer knowledge and managing expectations 
In terms of promoting awareness of and access to the consumer ADR 
network, the Directive has had some influence. However, these 
achievements need to be weighed against the potential obstacles to 
comprehension of the ADR network and the negative side-effects of the 
DSSURDFKHPERGLHGLQWKH8.·VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQVWUDWHJ\ 
This is not a new concern. The consumer ADR sector has been described as 
¶EOLQNHUHG DQG KDSKD]DUG·75 with no template for its design and position 
within the overall civil justice system. Instead, new schemes have been 
introduced as and when necessary to meet the dominant prevailing 
pressures, others have been developed by the private sector. Far from 
tackling this issue, post-Directive, the Government has made no attempt to 
distinguish formally the different forms of ADR available, other than creating 
an accredited and unaccredited division, and is content to let the market-
place dictate the resultant structure. A key downside to this approach is 
that it creates a number of layers of confusion amongst all parties even 
where a viable ombudsman route is available. Frequently, in order to 
identify that route a reasonably sophisticated awareness of the processes in 
place is required. Prior to the Directive, over 70 ADR schemes operated in 
the UK,76 by the end of 2015 there were 38 accredited and an unknown 
                                                          
74 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure: An Interim Review, 2015, ch.6, available at: 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/civil-courts-structure-review/civil-courts-structure-review-
ccsr-interim-report-published/; P. Cortes, ¶The Brave New World of Consumer Redress in 
the EU and the UK· (2016) Dispute Resolution xxxxx; 6HHDOVR3&RUWHV¶&RQFOXVLRQ·of this 
edited collection. 
75 Merricks, n. 58 above. 
76 Bis 2014, n 33 above.  
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number of unaccredited schemes. This proliferation will continue to make it 
difficult to promote and explain all forms of ADR to the general public.  
Such complexity is not insurmountable, particularly in the age of the 
internet and the various information sources described above. But 
complexity creates additional costs, with individual schemes required to 
take RQWKHUROHRI ¶WUDIILFGLUHFWRU· IRU ORVWFRPSODLQDQWV who do not fall in 
their jurisdiction. 77  Sometimes this complexity leads to overlaps with 
RVWHQVLEO\WKHVDPHPDWWHUIURPWKHFRQVXPHU·VSHUVSHFWLYHHJVRFLDOFDUH
house purchase) requiring the input of more than one ombudsman.78   
A further problem is that the complexity in the ADR network and its 
different forms, together with the variable titles that schemes use, make it 
considerably more difficult for the sector as a whole to promote a powerful 
and well-known ombudsman brand.79 There is research that suggests that 
consumers are more likely to use the ombudsman if they are already aware 
of an ombudsman before something goes wrong.80 But lack of consumer 
awareness has been a common problem for ombudsman schemes, creating 
for them the further burden of managing the mixed and often unrealistically 
high expectations of the complainant as to the process it entails and what it 
can offer. The Directive will likely make this situation worse because of the 
multiplicity of undefined ADR available. Further, under the Directive81 and 
ODR Regulation82, traders are required to notify consumers of the potential 
ADR routes available, regardless of whether or not a trader is a member of 
any nationally approved ADR process. This mixed message creates the 
SRWHQWLDOIRUUDLVLQJ¶IDOVHH[SHFWDWLRQV·DPRQJVWFRQVXPHUVDVWRWKHUHDFK
of ADR,83 and later cynicism when expected redress opportunities do not 
materialise. 
It is hardly surprising that the one scheme that has gone the furthest in 
overcoming these challenges is the integrated and large scale Financial 
Ombudsman Service. Without such integration, or at least rationalisation, 
the ability of the ombudsman sector to develop a clear and powerful 
narrative around the service it provides will always be held back. Worse still, 
the perceived legitimacy of the sector might be damaged if it comes to be 
seen as a tradeable commodity with variable standards applied. A degree of 
                                                          
77 Gill et al, n. 9 above, 11. 
78 Ibid, 12. 
79 Ibid, pp.16-20. 
80 Gfk NOP, n. 41 above, 36. 
81 Art. 13(1) of the ADR Directive. 
82 Art. 14(1) of the ODR Regulation 
83 1&UHXW]IHOGW ¶2PEXGVPDQ6FKHPHV - (QHUJ\6HFWRU LQ*HUPDQ\)UDQFHDQGWKH8.·
ch.5 of this edited collection. 
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harmonisation in the ombudsman sector would be one solution to this 
problem. Another is the maintenance of robust regulation. 
2. The ombudsman allows for more justice to be delivered 
The claim 
The core claim in favour of the ombudsman model is that it delivers justice, 
it does not just resolve disputes. But the concept of justice is a multi-faceted 
RQHDVLVWKHRPEXGVPDQ·VFODLP 
In terms of individualised justice, the ombudsman resolves disputes in both 
equitable and rights-based terms. Using an equitable approach, an 
ombudsman is empowered to review a dispute in the round in order to 
DUULYHDWD ¶IDLU·UHVXOW ORRNLQJDWDUDQJHRIIDFWRUVover and above strictly 
legal issues. This approach offers the potential for remedies which a judicial 
process focussed purely on the law might struggle to match. Ombudsman 
schemes though do additionally resolve numerous disputes purely on rights-
based terms, as defined in law. Indeed, many ombudsman schemes may 
claim to work to higher standards still, as they will be charged with applying 
sector codes of practice as well as the law.84   
On the downside, this mandate exposes the ombudsman to the critique that 
its decision-making lacks rigour and is unpredictable to all sides. For 
sceptics, a standard concern with ADR generally is that the hard legal 
interests or rights of the weaker party may be compromised within the 
process of resolution employed.85 At the very least, the claims in favour of 
the ombudsman require supporting evidence that an emphasis on the 
institution is not worsening the position for users, through consumer 
standards being driven by a weaker justice model. 
Delivering individualised justice under the Directive 
The implementation of the Directive enhances our ability to scrutinise the 
RPEXGVPDQ FRPPXQLW\·V claim to effectiveness. As indicated in Table 1 
above, the workload of consumer ombudsman schemes is already very high. 
But what the accreditation process offers the opportunity for is the provision 
of a more uniform and better coordinated set of benchmarks from which to 
note dispute resolution trends into the future. Such data analysis has 
proved problematic in the past because there has been no standardisation 
for recording key performance indicators in the sector. This is a shortcoming 
that competent authorities are now in a position to address. 
                                                          
84 C. Hodges, Modes of Redress for Consumers: ADR and Regulation, University of Oxford, 
Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No 48, July 2012, p.12.  
85 Eidenmiller and Engel, n. 11 above, pp.278-282. 
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If competent authorities are to take up the challenge and provide a 
meaningful analysis of ADR activity, however, they will need to measure the 
different forms of ADR that are provided. But this will not be a 
straightforward exercise. For instance, of the 38 accredited schemes as of 1 
October 2015, only eight offer a full independent ombudsman service.86 Of 
the remainder, there is a spread of complaint-handlers, adjudication 
services, arbitrators, and specialised conciliation and mediation services. 
Indeed, an interesting feature of the way that the UK has implemented the 
Directive is that it has encouraged competition between different forms of 
dispute resolution, as well as individual providers. In order to understand 
the impact of the Directive, therefore, it will be important to trace the 
distribution of workload across these different forms, both in terms of the 
overall numbers and the nature of disputes.    
It is possible that an impact of the Directive will be to enhance the workload 
of ombudsman schemes, but that does not necessarily entail that more 
adjudicated justice will be delivered. For some years, most ombudsman 
schemes have PRYHG DZD\ IURP D ¶5ROOV 5R\FH· LQYHVWLJDWRU\ DSSURDFK WR
dispute resolution, to one which has become much more pragmatic and 
proportional in its attention to detail. 87  What this means is that the 
complaints selected for full investigation and thence adjudication have been 
significantly reduced, with instead an enhanced focus placed upon weeding 
out weak or inappropriate cases and employing various informal strategies 
to settle affairs before any kind of formal determination is required. In the 
UK, the scale of this activity has been much highlighted,88 raising a concern 
that the drive for user satisfaction through securing early settlements might 
mean that the goal of securing just settlements becomes deprioritised in the 
ombudsman process.89 The Directive does not alter this dynamic towards 
informal and proportionate dispute resolution, and possibly accelerates it. 
A key safeguard against declining adherence to standards of justice is that, 
unless there are overwhelming public policy grounds for doing so, access to 
judicial dispute resolution must remain a viable option. In some areas, 
procedural incentives, such as cost orders, operate to penalise parties who 
                                                          
86 Financial Ombudsman Service, Pensions Ombudsman Service, Furniture Ombudsman (a 
scheme which also comprises the Dispute Resolution Ombudsman and the Home 
Improvement Ombudsman), Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education, 
Ombudsman Services, The Property Ombudsman, The Retail Ombudsman, The Waterways 
Ombudsman.  
87 Buck et al, n. 46 above, ch.4. 
88 Gill et al, n. 31; V. Bondy, M. Doyle and C. Hirst,  The use of informal resolution 
approaches by ombudsmen in the UK and Ireland: A mapping study, Hot off the Press: 
London, 2014. Available at: 
https://ombudsmanresearch.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/the-use-of-informal-resolution-
approaches-by-ombudsmen-in-the-uk-and-ireland-a-mapping-study-1.pdf 
89 Genn, n. 13 above.  
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¶XQUHDVRQDEO\·GRnot use ADR to resolve disputes.90 This policy reduces the 
control that the consumer has over the resolution of their dispute, but is 
mitigated so long as access to the civil courts is retained after an ADR 
process, including the ombudsman, has been completed. 91  This is the 
position under the UK Regulations, 92  and is an important principle for 
reasons that go beyond the need to adhere to rule of law requirements.93 In 
order to demonstrate the integrity of the ADR scheme it must be possible for 
its output to be disputed and scrutinised in a court of law, a factor which 
outweighs the cost implications for the consumer as well as the trader.94  
Another measure to protect justice values is for ADR schemes to identify 
cases best suited to the courts if, for instance, they raise contentious legal 
issues. The Directive has reduced the grounds available to an ADR scheme 
for refusing to consider a complaint, but still allows for some channelling of 
disputes on WKHJURXQGRI¶VHULRXVO\LPSDLU>LQJ@WKHHIIHFWLYHRSHUDWLRQRIWKH
$'5· VFKHPH WR leave some cases to be heard in court. 95 To deal with the 
crossover between ADR and the courts, a further option might be to provide 
all statutory ombudsman schemes with the power to refer points of law to 
the courts, for later application to the complaint by the ombudsman.96  
But despite the potential for the courts to become involved in ADR 
proceedings, the instances of judicial oversight are low. Thus the potential 
for rights-based justice to be bypassed by the operation of ombudsman 
schemes remains significant post-implementation. To confront concerns, the 
emphasis in regulation of the ADR sector should be on not just laying out 
the rule of law standards that should apply, but evidencing their 
performance. For the consumer ombudsman community this should include 
an account as to how individual schemes contribute towards the 
maintenance of a consistent body of standard-setting decision-making (what 
might be referred to as ombudsprudence) that offers guidance to businesses 
and users. As will be described below, however, not all of these 
considerations have been factored into the Directive or its implementing UK 
Regulations. 
                                                          
90 English Civil Procedure Rules, r 44.5(3). Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS [2004] 
EWCA Civ 576.  
91 Eg Case C-317/08, C-317/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08, Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia 
SpA, et al, March 18, 2010. 
92 Eg see Regulation 14C and Sched.3 8(c)(3) and 11(a), n. 26 above.  
93 Eg ECHR, Art. 6; the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights, Art. 47; ADR Directive, Arts. 
11 and 12. 
94 Hodges, n. 43 above, p. 596. 
95  Art.5(4), n.1 above, see Directive 2013/11/EU (Directive on consumer ADR) - issues 
emerging from the meetings of the ADR Expert Group p.11. 
96 Eg Legal Services Act 2007, s. 133(3)(b) and see Hodges, n. 19, xx-xx for a discussion on 
this point.  
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3. The ombudsman promotes collective justice 
The claim 
One of the oft-stated benefits of the ombudsman model is that it is capable 
of moving beyond individualised dispute resolution in order to feed into a 
wider process of learning lessons from complaints and transferring these 
back to the overseen sector. This quasi-regulatory role establishes a capacity 
for advancing justice that is potentially far-reaching in terms of: delivering 
for individuals that are otherwise unlikely to complain; preventing multiple 
injustices occurring in the first place; and improving the reputation of 
businesses. It is also a role that can be enhanced through the regular 
interchange of intelligence between an ombudsman and its partner regulator. 
Critics of the ombudsman, however, point to the lack of evidence that such 
gains are achieved in practice and express concern about over-regulation.97 
Indeed, far from being a constructive service, the process of attempting to 
feedback information might be a costly distraction, often delivered too far 
after the event to make a meaningful impact with providers who, if they are 
minded to, probably already possess sufficient information with which to 
change their practices.  
Delivering the lessons from complaints 
Under the Directive, the requirement for ADR schemes to report information 
to a competent authority should enhance data on their operations and the 
sector it oversees, albeit in a fashion that will be quite complicated. However, 
it is uncertain that the Directive will encourage more intelligent use of 
complaint data than at present.  
The Regulation does require ADR schemes to include in their annual report 
¶DGHVFULSWLRQRIDQ\V\VWHPDWLFRUVLJQLILFDQWSUREOHPVWKDWRFFXUIUHTXHQWO\
DQG OHDG WR GLVSXWHV EHWZHHQ FRQVXPHUV DQG WUDGHUV· 98  alongside 
recommendations for good practice. 99  But in a competitive market, ADR 
schemes may be disincentivised from using that information to construct 
lessons, or training, for traders if it makes their product more expensive and 
thereby less attractive to traders. That same set of incentives also reduces 
the potential for ADR schemes to make public information about the 
complaints that they have handled about traders. Data on individual traders 
is not required to be published by the UK Regulations making it less likely 
that consumers will benefit from increased knowledge on the service 
                                                          
97 Eg Cabinet Office, A Public Service Ombudsman: Government Response to Consultation 
Cabinet Office, 2015.  
98 Schedule 5(c), n. 26 above. 
99 Ibid, Schedule 5(d). 
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standards being applied by traders. The one set of data that must be 
published is the rate of complaints found in favour of the consumer, but this 
might assist traders in selecting those ADR schemes more likely to find 
against the consumer.100   
Competent authorities may be the driver for sector-wide information 
gathering to take place, yet their incentives or available resources to enter 
into such work are also unclear. There is no mention of this role in the UK 
Regulations and with large sectors of the consumer market to be covered by 
competitor ADR schemes, what information that is collated will come from 
multiple schemes and will be difficult to harmonise and interpret.  
Under the UK implementation model, therefore, there is no embedded drive 
towards using complaints information to promote consumer action or better 
industry responses. Where sector complaints data is analysed and 
published it will be either as a result of legislative requirements in particular 
sectors, or through the self-generated initiative of a consumer ombudsman 
or competent authority. For instance, in a regulator commissioned report, 
Ombudsman Services has recently been urged to clarify its approach 
towards identifying systemic bad practice and to do more to disseminate 
good practice.101  Without such a take up of responsibility, the potential for 
complaints information to foster collective goals will not be realised. 
4. The ombudsman is fair and operates to high standards 
The claim 
The ombudsman method has a strong claim to offering a fair process, one 
which creates a level playing field capable of overcoming the in-built biases 
of the adversarial approach. However, a familiar critique of the ombudsman 
process is its rather opaque approach to due process, with common 
concerns the transparency in decision-making and the reduced capacity to 
cross-examine the evidence of the other side or participate actively in the 
process of resolution.102  
Without reassurance as to the quality of decision-making then the output of 
the ombudsman can be variously portrayed as arbitrary, insufficiently 
cognisant of the input of the parties, and biased. Other concerns will relate 
                                                          
100 Cortes 2015, n 32 above, p. 129. 
101 Lucerna partners,  Review of ombudsman services: energy : A report for Ofgem, July 2015, 
available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2015/09/review_of_ombudsman_servi
ces_energy_2.pdf 
102 - .LQJ ¶$FFRXQWDELOLW\ 7KH 9DOXH RI &RXUWV LQ WKH /LJKW RI WKH $OWHUQDWLYHV· 6RFLDO
Science Research Network (SSRN) paper (18 June 2007). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027626, pp.27-29. 
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to the quality of the individual ombudsman and his/her team, particularly 
where it is known that most decisions are made by delegates. There is no 
formal recruitment criteria for entry into the profession or requirement of 
legal qualification.  
Evaluating the Directive·VDSSURDFKWR standards 
Prior to the Directive, regulation of the sector was lightweight and ad hoc, 
being exercised through a combination of: (i) legislation, if the scheme was 
statutory; (ii) occasional interventions of Parliament and the Executive; (iii) 
any corporate governance arrangements built into the scheme; (iv) courts, if 
litigation was brought. Noticeably, there was very little by way of holistic 
consideration of sector standards, with responsibility for ADR dispersed 
across several government departments. Only in-built corporate governance 
arrangements offered the prospect of sustained oversight. 
By contrast, the Directive offers the potential for a robust regulatory model 
to be built for ADR. The most radical idea embraced by the Directive is its 
dual regulatory ambition to set standards for the sector and monitor 
schemes in delivering those standards. This approach provides the sector 
with the potential capacity to defend its authority and status as against the 
standard criticisms that ADR, including the ombudsman method, lacks in 
terms of fairness and transparency.  
Subject to some alteration in legal language, the UK Regulations repeat the 
standards included in the Directive.103 In general, two forms of standards 
can be distinguished as being imposed: those standards aimed at (i) setting 
benchmarks for customer service and (ii) enhancing the quality of decision-
making.  
In the UK, the ombudsman sector already widely employs the service 
standards included in the Directive, albeit in places the required detail and 
time-lines have changed as a result of implementation. In the short-term, 
this has meant that the new set of service standards have created work for 
ombudsman schemes, insofar as their internal processes have had to be 
interrogated, changed and new processes and training put in place. But 
while enhancing customer service is an important issue for which the sector 
has on occasion been criticised, it is the quality controls imposed by the 
Directive that in the long-term should represent the most significant 
innovation for the UK. Much of what is contained in the Directive/UK 
Regulations in establishing minimum requirements for access, expertise, 
impartiality, transparency, fairness and legality represents an important 
                                                          
103 See in particular Schedule 3, n. 26 above. 
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step forward.104 However, because the Directive seeks to capture standards 
across the whole of both the ADR sector and the EU, in some respects the 
standards included within it may not go far enough for the purposes of 
upholding the ombudsman brand.   
One example will be provided here to illustrate the potential risks. ADR 
schemes are required to be independent under the UK Regulations, 
including the requirement for an ADR entity WRKDYH¶DULQJ-fenced budget at 
LWVGLVSRVDOZKLFKLVVXIILFLHQWWRHQDEOHLWWRFDUU\RXWLWVIXQFWLRQV·105 But 
the UK Regulations establish no special measures for the appointment 
processes of office-holders, or full autonomy of the ADR schemes from their 
funders. This means that it is possible to satisfy independence requirements 
through the device of creating Chinese walls between funders and ADR 
schemes. The resultant risk is that close connections can be retained 
between traders and accredited ADR schemes, as is evident in the UK where 
trade associations and self-regulatory bodies have been able to gain 
accredited ADR status. This may be a sensible approach towards 
encouraging parties into ADR that might not otherwise be favourable 
towards it, but it lumps together highly procedurally independent forms of 
ADR, such as the Financial Ombudsman Service, with a range of ADR 
schemes which offer only arms-length independence.  
Other examples exist where the ombudsman community should be aspiring 
to higher standards than those outlined in the Directive. For instance, 
ombudsman schemes should not just be relying on fair processes, they 
should be demonstrably verifying and providing evidence of the fairness of 
decisions made. Alongside publication of their decisions, this could include 
embedding into their internal governance systems that allow for a measure 
of external scrutiny of the quality of their decision-making.  
Member state regulatory arrangements may serve as the vehicle for going 
further than the minimum requirements of the Directive. However, as will be 
argued in the next section, in the UK this is unlikely to happen because of 
the institutional design adopted.  
5. The ombudsman is accountable  
The claim 
No system of justice is error-proof, hence there is a need for mechanisms by 
which to verify and test the quality of output. Various models for 
establishing accountability frameworks around ombudsman schemes do 
                                                          
104 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Articles 6-11. 
105 Schedule 3 para.3, n. 25 above.  
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exist which can assist in verifying the efficacy of decision-making and 
output. But unless an appropriate accountability framework is put in place, 
the reputational risk for the institution is high, as has been demonstrated in 
recent years with some ombudsman schemes.106 Potentially the risk to an 
RPEXGVPDQ·VUHSXWDWLRQDUHespecially high ZKHQWKHVWDWH·VLQSXWwith its 
accompanying claim to neutrality and representation of the collective 
interest, is kept to a minimum. 
Evaluating the strength of the UK structure of competent authorities 
The standards developed in the Directive represent only a starting point. 
Their true power and effectiveness will be dependent on the capacity and 
willingness of the regulators of the sector to monitor and enforce 
performance, and develop the standards further.  
For the first time in the UK there is a system of competent authorities to 
regulate the sector. However, consistent with its overall policy of minimising 
the creation of new regulatory burdens and avoiding the cost of establishing 
new public bodies, the Government passed on the competent authority 
responsibility to pre-existing regulatory bodies. An advantage of this 
approach is that traders might trust their sector regulator more than an 
alternative agency with no particular knowledge of their sector. It might also 
allow regulatory bodies to take advantage of their specialist knowledge of the 
sector and pre-existing working relationships.  
But there are a number of downsides to the UK multiple competent 
authority approach. First, by distributing the power of monitoring standards 
across a series of bodies the importance of the role has been downgraded. 
Instead of creating a central pool of knowledge on the ADR sector, the 
authority and stored expertise is diluted by another layer of complexity in 
the system. 
Second, what might appear a sensible cost-saving exercise has created 
numerous forms of duplicated activity in terms of training, system 
construction, form filling and decision-making, both for the regulatory 
bodies involved and some of the ADR schemes. In what might be an extreme 
example, Ombudsman Services has applied to be an accredited ADR scheme 
to six different competent authorities. Because these are costs that can be 
charged for in the accreditation process, they are costs which are ultimately 
passed on to the consumer.  
Third, because the responsibility for the ADR sector is distributed, the 
opportunities for economies of scale are lost and the potential for any form 
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DRAFT 
27 
 
of added value scrutiny of standards in the sector limited. The danger is that 
competent authorities will limit their input to the strict terms of the statute 
and not undertake more detailed work. This need not necessarily be the 
FDVHDVIRULQVWDQFHZLWKWKH)&$·VUHFHQWUHYLHZRIFRPSODLQW-handling in 
the financial sector.107 But the UK Regulations are virtually silent on the 
standard setting duties of the competent authorities. Indeed, the UK 
Regulations only include a brief reference at Regulation 18 to the duties of 
WKH8.·V¶3RLQWRI&RQWDFW·ZKLFKLVWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHWR¶LGHQWLI\EHVW
SUDFWLFHV· ¶VKRUWFRPLQJV· LQ WKH IXQFWLRQLQJ RI $'5 VFKHPHV DQG
¶UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRQKRZWRLPSURYHWKHHIIHFWLYHDQGHIILFLHQWIXQFWLRQLQJ·
For less well-resourced sectors, which are occupied by a multiple variety of 
ADR schemes, the likelihood is that the capacity of the competent authority 
to provide any form of improvement role will be limited. Instead, reliance will 
be placed on the market to act as the de facto regulatory agent, and this 
risks a drift to the bottom. 
Fourth, the formation of a network of competent authorities creates the 
potential for variable standards to be applied across the sector, with no 
discernible explanation as to why such variety might be justified other than 
that different competent authorities have been given the responsibility. ADR 
schemes may feel penalised for operating in more onerously regulated 
sectors, and insofar as there is competition, tempted to migrate to those 
sectors where the standards imposed are less rigorously applied. As for 
consumers, it will become harder for WKHP¶WRXQGHUVWDQGDQGQDYLJDWHWKH
ODQGVFDSHDQGWRFDOLEUDWHWKHLUH[SHFWDWLRQVIURPSURYLGHUWRSURYLGHU·108  
Fifth, absent of responsibility for the sector as a whole or any overriding 
duty to enhance standards in ADR, each individual competent authority is 
incentivised to undertake a minimalist job. A particular concern here is the 
degree of ongoing oversight of the sector and the prospect of removing 
accreditation status. 109  Being established and empowered by secondary 
legislation, competent authorities will be subject to judicial review and will 
be required to provide reasons for any decision to refuse accreditation.110 In 
such circumstances, sticking to soft interpretations of the UK Regulations 
and not attempting to impose more onerous standards might be the default 
strategy.  
)LQDOO\ WKH 8.·V LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ SURFHVV KDV QRW PDGH LW D FRPSXOVRU\
requirement for ADR providers to be accredited, meaning that there will 
                                                          
107 Financial Conduct Authority, Improving Complaint Handling, CP14/30, December 2014.  
108 Financial Ombudsman Service, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumers, June 2014, 
p. 5. 
109 Regulation 13, n. 25 above. 
110 Regulations 9(7) and 13, n. 25 above. 
DRAFT 
28 
 
remain the potential for a deregulated sector of ADR schemes. The premise 
is that the market advantage in being accredited will isolate the 
unaccredited market in ADR provision and make it unattractive for traders 
to use their services. But traders will retain a natural incentive to use 
unaccredited ADR providers that are not independent and offer cheaper 
services. Indeed, in some sectors with small numbers of complaints, the 
ongoing costs of accreditation may make it disadvantageous for all parties to 
enter into the process. Moreover, even if made aware of the options, whether 
a consumer whose trader has offered dispute resolution through an 
unaccredited ADR provider will have the wherewithal to make the distinction 
is debatable. One sector that has currently opted out of the ADR 
accreditation process altogether is the legal sector. Both the statutory 
schemes set up to deal with complaints in the legal sector, the Legal 
Services Ombudsman and the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, have 
as yet been unable to revise their schemes of rules to make them compliant 
with the Directive, with the profession seemingly unwilling to accept the 
required measures.111  
E. The future for the regulation of ADR in the UK 
What the previous section has argued is that in several respects the 
Directive provides for only a shallow level of protection of the standards of 
fairness and process required of ADR providers, and requires little in terms 
of evidencing the quality of decision-making. With regard to the ombudsman 
sector at least, this level of safeguard may not be enough to shield it from 
the criticism that it provides insufficient levels of justice. The risk is that in 
the market-place, competition for business might lead to the perception of 
an unacceptable reduction in the quality of ombudsman services being 
provided and a subsequent loss of faith in the sector. 112  Further, the 
manner in which competent authorities have been introduced does not 
provide for a focussed role in monitoring, enforcing and upgrading 
standards of ADR. To mitigate the potential problems that might arise, in 
this last section two ways forward are explored. 
1. A unified competent authority  
In the multiple competent authority model adopted in the UK, no one body 
has the data to collate best practice on ADR and there is only a minimal 
incentive for competent authorities to compile such information or act as a 
                                                          
111  Eg Legal Ombudsman, Consultation: Proposed ADR Scheme Rules, September 2015, 
available at: http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Consultation-ADR-Scheme-Rules.pdf 
112 Hodges, n. 43 above, 598. 
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force for higher standards. The suspicion is that quality controls will be kept 
to a minimum and restricted to attributes that are easy to measure and tick 
off.  
The challenge of enforcing appropriate regulatory standards would be less of 
a problem if responsibility were endowed on a single authoritative regulatory 
voice, rather than eight. But even if the principle of merging the functions of 
the competent authorities within one ADR focussed body were accepted, 
there is no obvious candidate body to host this function and creating a new 
body goes against wider Government policy.113 Even the solution of parking 
Government responsibility for ADR in the Ministry of Justice, the 
Department most likely to have the relevant expertise to promote justice 
issues, is unlikely to be taken forward given the business focus of the ADR 
Directive. Potentially, EU-wide guidance on best practice may come out of 
the reports that are submitted by competent authorities to the Commission 
¶RQWKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGIXQFWLRQLQJRI$'5HQWLWLHV·.114 But the diversity of 
ADR models in place across the EU would not assist the construction of 
more focussed standards for any one form of ADR, such as the consumer 
ombudsman model, even if this was considered a politically acceptable 
solution. One other potential development may be that, under revised 
devolution arrangements, the Scottish Government takes on the role of 
providing a unified competent authority service.115  If this happens, then 
although the jurisdiction of the Scottish arrangement would apply only to 
Scotland, as most UK based ADR providers will operate in Scotland they 
would probably build their operation around the standards set by the 
highest competent authority. As this chapter is completed, however, the 
function of consumer protection has not been included in the reserved list 
for the Scottish Parliament.116 
2. Alternative sources of legitimacy 
The ombudsman sector in the UK offers the possibility of another way 
forward, namely self-regulation. Separately to the Directive, the combined 
impact of section 56 of the Companies Act 2006, the Company, Limited 
Liability Partnership and Business Names (Sensitive Words and Expressions) 
Regulations 2014, 117  and Companies House guidance, grants the 
Ombudsman Association (OA) a quasi-regulatory role. As from 7 April 2015, 
                                                          
113  Minister for Cabinet Office, Written Statement to Parliament, 17 December 2015, 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/achievements-of-the-2010-15-
public-bodies-reform-programme 
114 ADR Directive, n. 1 above, Art.20(6). 
115 Hill Report, Report of the Working Group on Consumer and Competition Policy for Scotland. 
(Scottish Government, Edinburgh, October 2015), p. 24. 
116 Scotland Bill, ss.47-58. 
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for an organisation to register its company name with the title ombudsman, 
DPRQJVWRWKHUWKLQJVLWPXVW¶be a member of the [OA] at ombudsman level 
PHPEHUVKLS· 118  Thus all the accredited ADR schemes carrying the title 
ombudsman now possess the stamp of approval of both a competent 
authority and the OA.  
Assuming that there is a commercial advantage in being branded an 
ombudsman, this set of provisions provides the OA with an opportunity to 
take control of the standards-setting agenda. The positives in this solution 
are that the OA has a strong self-interest in maintaining and enhancing the 
reputation of the sector. It also possesses the knowledge and expertise 
required to collate data and develop higher standards across the 
ombudsman sector as a whole, not just the consumer sector. Further, being 
a soft law organisation, it can proceed in this process organically through 
sharing best practice, training and revising internal membership rules at a 
pace appropriate to practitioner developments. This reflexive model of self-
regulation in the short term looks the most viable way forward and provides 
a model for how other forms of ADR can demonstrate their legitimacy.119  
But the self-regulatory model also offers an uncertain road map forward. 
The OA is a very broad church made up of a range of very different 
organisations from a number of different jurisdictions. Some of the 
membership may be reluctant to concede to more rigorous oversight. 
)XUWKHU WKH2$·Vremit is conflicted in that it is primarily a representative 
association with a role to bring like-minded bodies together to share ideas 
and experience, as well as to lobby Government and other sectors. The 
prospect of the OA toughening up its standards on membership is also offset 
by the possibility of legal action being brought against it for the rejection or 
removal of membership status. In view of this pressure, and the knowledge 
that at present the Government favours competition in ADR provision, can 
the OA be strong enough to push for higher standards?120  
3. Conclusion 
The ADR Directive has added further energy to and thrown the spotlight on 
a rapidly evolving and confusing sector of the civil justice system. The 
analysis in this chapter suggests that there will be an advance in the 
                                                          
118 Companies House, Guidance (see Annex A, p.51-2). However, once the title is registered, 
there is no obvious legal means to force the removal of the ombudsman brand should the 
scheme subsequently fail to secure revalidation with the OA.  
119 For a discussion on mediation, see P. Cortes, The Promotion of Civil and Commercial 
Mediation in the UK (July 19, 2015). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper 
No. 15-23. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2633215, pp.16-8 
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availability and public awareness of ADR, and in the quantity of information 
on the operation of sector. There is also now a strong template, that was 
previously absent, for providing reassurance that the quality of provision in 
the sector is sufficient. 
However, this chapter has also demonstrated that the implementation 
strategy of the Government is likely to be less influential than it could have 
been. In part this may be because solutions in the ADR sector are wrapped 
up in a larger debate about the best design for the civil justice system. In 
particular, if a viable Online Court can be introduced, then the need for 
mandatory ADR recedes. But the refusal of the Government to introduce a 
single competent authority means that the sector lacks a focus point for 
quality control. Until this decision is reversed, professional groupings such 
as the OA represent the best hope for protecting the public interest in 
maintain appropriate standards of justice.         
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Abstract 
This chapter analyses the manner in which the ADR Directive and ODR 
Regulation have been implemented in the UK, with a particular focus on the 
ombudsman sector. The chapter argues that in the UK implementation has 
been minimalist and that this represents a missed opportunity. The 
Directive is capable of laying the foundations for robust ADR, but the 
regulation of the sector looks deficient. As a result, there is a heightened 
risk that sub-optimal standards in the sector will go undetected which may 
in turn undermine user confidence. More work needs to be done to make the 
regulatory set-up a standard-bearer for the sector rather than a passive 
observer.  
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